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RECONCILING BANKRUPTCY LAW AND CORPORATE LAW 
PRINCIPLES: IMPOSING SUCCESSOR LIABILITY ON GM 
AND SIMILAR “SLEIGHT-OF-HAND” 363 SALES 
ABSTRACT 
It was only June 2009 when General Motors filed for chapter 11 
bankruptcy protection after suffering through the crippling financial effects of 
the 2008 financial crisis. Now in 2016, General Motors has entered what some 
have called its renaissance period with flourishing sales and increased 
profitability. Meanwhile, thousands of vehicle owners who were harmed by 
defective General Motors vehicles have been barred by 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) of 
the Bankruptcy Code from seeking an equitable remedy from the now thriving 
company. This result is largely due to § 363(f), which allows for assets to be 
sold in bankruptcy free from all liabilities including the tort claims of those 
injured or harmed by defective vehicles. 
This Comment argues that those harmed by General Motors’ defective 
vehicles should have access to an equitable remedy via the successor liability 
doctrine. The successor liability doctrine allows for an asset purchaser to be 
accountable for the liabilities of the seller under certain circumstances. 
Successor liability has been scantly applied to § 363 sale purchasers. 
However, this Comment contends that General Motors’ § 363 sale was a 
“sleight-of-hand’ transaction which allowed the corporation to essentially sell 
its assets to itself and escape most of its liabilities. This Comment explains that 
the successor liability doctrine was intended to prohibit these “sleight-of-
hand” transactions. Furthermore, this Comment discusses how to reconcile the 
language of § 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code, and the objectives of the 
bankruptcy process in general, with the goals of the successor liability 
doctrine. Finally, this Comment proposes to amend the Bankruptcy Code to 
internalize the cost of harm of defective products and ensure due process for 
consumers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
To date, General Motors (“GM”) has recalled over two and a half million 
vehicles due to defective ignition switches that have been linked to at least 
twenty-nine deaths.1 Investigative reports indicate that the company was likely 
aware of the manufacturing defects for over a decade.2 For years, evidence 
connecting the defects to accidents involving GM vehicles was largely 
ignored.3 Given that GM was likely aware of the defective ignition switches 
for years, it begs multiple questions, including why did it risk incurring a 
mountain of tort liability by leaving millions of these dangerous, defective 
vehicles in the hands of consumers? And, why did no one else call attention to 
the matter?4 
To answer these questions requires a look to the 2008 financial crisis and 
the integral part that the U.S. federal government had in all aspects of GM’s 
financial rehabilitation. On December 31, 2008, the U.S. Treasury Department 
extended $13.4 billion to GM, making the U.S. federal government the largest 
stakeholder in the corporation.5 Under the terms of the government financing 
agreement, GM had to present a plan for long-term viability in an effort to 
rebuild and restructure. Unsatisfied with GM’s viability plan, President Obama 
announced on March 30, 2009, that GM’s efforts fell short of justifying the 
continued use of taxpayer dollars and gave the company sixty days to adopt 
drastic changes, or face bankruptcy.6 On June 1, 2009, GM filed for chapter 11 
 
 1 Gregory Wallace, GM Ignition Switch Death Toll Climbs to 29, CNN (Oct. 20, 2014, 5:59 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2014/10/20/news/companies/general-motors-feinberg-claims/index.html. 
 2 Michael A. Fletcher, General Motors Recalls Another 2.7 Million Vehicles, WASH. POST (May 15, 
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/general-motors-recalls-another-27-million-
vehicles/2014/05/15/f8bce616-dc40-11e3-bda1-9b46b2066796_story.html. 
 3 See, e.g., Tom Krisher & Amy Forliti, Families of Teens Killed in Wisconsin Crash Drop lawsuit 
Against GM; Will Consider Settlement, U.S. NEWS (Sept. 24, 2014, 7:07 PM), http://www.usnews.com/ 
news/business/articles/2014/09/24/teen-crash-victims-families-drop-suit-against-gm (discussing the case of an 
eighteen year old and a fifteen year old killed in a car crash involving a Chevrolet Cobalt (Chevrolet is a 
subsidiary of GM) where a state trooper discovered the connection between the defective ignition switch and 
the crash—the company and government regulators ignored the trooper’s findings for years). 
 4 In 2014, GM spent an estimated $2.5 billion recalling vehicles. See Joann Muller, GM Profit Plunges 
on Recall Costs; $400 Million Set Aside for Victims, FORBES (July 24, 2014, 8:58 AM), http://www.forbes. 
com/sites/joannmuller/2014/07/24/gm-profit-plunges-on-recall-costs-400-million-set-aside-for-victims/. 
 5 In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 477 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Campbell v. 
Motors Liquation Co. (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), 428 B.R. 43 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), and aff’d sub nom. Parker 
v. Motors Liquidation Co. (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), 430 B.R. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), enforcement denied 
sub nom. In re Motors Liquidation Co., 529 B.R. 510 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 6 Sheryl G. Stolberg & Bill Vlasic, President Gives a Short Lifeline to Carmakers, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/31/business/31auto.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; see GENERAL 
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bankruptcy in the Southern District of New York.7 GM’s bankruptcy filing 
showed that its liabilities were more than double its assets, with $82.3 billion 
in assets and $172.8 billion in liabilities.8  
Before the company had even filed for bankruptcy, GM had already entered 
into a proposed sale agreement under § 363(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, which 
allowed the company to restructure its debts by selling substantially all of its 
assets (the “363 Sale”).9 The bankruptcy court approved GM’s prepackaged 
363 Sale on July 5, 2009.10 The court referred to the asset purchasing entity as 
“New GM,” and referred to the selling entity as “Old GM.” 
Under § 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code, all assets sold in a 363 Sale are 
“free and clear of any interest in such property. . . .”11 Thus, New GM received 
substantially all of the company’s assets while Old GM held on to most of the 
company’s burdensome liabilities, allowing New GM to continue operating 
free from past debts.12 GM’s 363 Sale was a quintessential “sleight-of-hand 
transaction,” in which a debtor is permitted to internally restructure under the 
guise of an asset sale. Old GM assumed all future liability claims from 
incidents that occurred prior to the bankruptcy filing date, and successor 
liability claims against New GM were barred.13Consequently, § 363(f) has had 
the effect of barring the victims of GM’s defective vehicles from seeking an 
equitable remedy. 
New GM contends the 363 Sale created a “bankruptcy shield” from product 
liability claims filed against the company.14 These arguments have been largely 
 
MOTORS CORP., RESTRUCTURING PLAN FOR LONG-TERM VIABILITY (2008), http://online.wsj.com/public/ 
resources/documents/gm_restructuring_plan120208.pdf. 
 7 Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. at 477. 
 8 Voluntary Petition at 18, In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 477 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d 
sub nom. Campbell v. Motors Liquation Co. (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), 428 B.R. 43 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), and 
aff’d sub nom. Parker v. Motors Liquidation Co. (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), 430 B.R. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), 
enforcement denied sub nom. In re Motors Liquidation Co., 529 B.R. 510 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 9 Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. at 477. 
 10 “Prepackaged” means the sale was agreed to before the filing of GM’s bankruptcy petition.  
 11 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2012). 
 12 Id.; Kevin Krolicki & David Bailey, GM Exits Bankruptcy, REUTERS (July 10, 2009, 7:20 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/07/10/us-gm-idUSTRE5690JO20090710. 
 13 Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. at 477 (noting that Old GM will retain “product liability claims arising 
out of products delivered prior to the Closing. . . .”); see also Stephen J. Lubben, G.M.’s Bankruptcy Will 
Probably Shield It from Most New Claims, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2014 3:43 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/ 
2014/04/23/g-m-s-bankruptcy-will-probably-shield-it-from-most-new-claims/. 
 14 See In re Motors Liquidation Co., 513 B.R. 467, 469, 476–77 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014); Paul M. Barret, 
GM Plays Legal Games with Its Recall Liability: Four Blunt Points, BLOOMBERG BUS., (Apr. 21, 2014), 
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successful in barring successor liability.15 However, at the time of this 
publication, the Second Circuit was considering whether successor liability 
claims should be allowed against New GM.16 
The policies behind allowing companies like GM to apply § 363(f) to bar 
tort victims from an equitable remedy must be re-evaluated. When large 
corporations like GM assemble dangerous, defective products, they should not 
have the option to discharge future tort liability without proper notice and 
reasonable compensation to all affected consumers. This Comment uses the 
case of GM (including its bankruptcy filing, allegations of fraud against the 
corporation, and underlying product liability claims against the corporation) as 
an illustrative example of why large corporate manufacturers who engage in a 
“sleight-of-hand” 363 Sale should be held accountable using the doctrine of 
successor liability. The imposition of successor liability would force those 
firms to internalize the cost of harm of defective products and ensure due 
process for consumers 
Part I of this Comment provides a brief overview of chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection and the use of 363 Sales. Part II of this Comment introduces the 
doctrine of successor liability and argues that § 363 should be amended to 
allow for the imposition of successor liability against firms that enter into 
“sleight-of-hand” 363 sale transactions. Part III further discusses how the 
doctrine can be reconciled with the language of § 363(f) and the underlying 
purpose of the bankruptcy process. 
I. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTER 11 AND 363 SALES 
This Section gives a brief overview of chapter 11 bankruptcy, the use of 
363 Sales in bankruptcy, and the rise of 363 Sales of substantially all of a 
company’s assets. Finally, this Section turns to GM’s path to bankruptcy, its 




 15 See Motors Liquidation Co., 513 B.R. at 469, 476–77 (enforcing the injunctive provisions of GM’s 
363 Sale and barring product liability claims based upon the theory of successor liability). In 2015, Judge 
Gerber of the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York opened the door ever so slightly for 
claimants by allowing punitive damage claims against New GMs but only to the extent that the damages were 
based on the knowledge or conduct of New GM. See In re Motors Liquidation Co., 541 B.R. 104, 125 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2015). However, Judge Gerber held that New GM could be responsible for claims based on 
knowledge or conduct by Old GM which was “inherited” by New GM under nonbankruptcy law. Id. at 143. 
 16 See Brief for Ignition Switch Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs at 10, In re Motors Liquidation Co., No. 
15-2844-bk (2d Cir. Nov. 16, 2015).  
WARNER GALLEYSPROOFS 5/11/2016 11:59 AM 
2016] RECONCILING BANKRUPTCY LAW PRINCIPLES 541 
successor liability claims against GM, thus preventing victims of GM’s 
defective vehicles from seeking equitable relief. 
A. Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Protection 
Failing corporations often must decide whether to file for bankruptcy 
protection. Filing for chapter 11 bankruptcy allows the debtor to reorganize its 
debts, while continuing to operate, use, and sell its assets throughout the 
bankruptcy process. The debtor begins the chapter 11 process by filing a 
bankruptcy petition with the court. The filing triggers an automatic stay against 
all creditors, freezing debt collection and allowing breathing room for the 
debtor-in-possession (“DIP”).17 A DIP must then propose a plan to its creditors 
outlining how it will repay them.18 Only the DIP may file a plan for 
reorganization during the first 120 days. If all classes of creditors do not accept 
the DIP’s plan after 180 days from the petition date, then a creditor may 
propose an alternate plan. 
The Bankruptcy Code sets out a priority system that dictates the order in 
which creditors are repaid.19 Tort victims are considered unsecured non-
priority creditors, meaning they are only repaid after all other secured and 
priority creditors have been repaid.20 DIPs usually cannot generate enough 
cash to repay all creditors who file claims against the estate and so tort 
claimants often end up with little or no payment.21 The low priority given to 
 
 17 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012); see 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1); ROBERT R. BLISS & GEORGE G. KAUFMAN, U.S. 
CORPORATE AND BANK INSOLVENCY REGIMES: AN ECONOMIC COMPARISON AND EVALUATION 11 (2006), 
https://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/publications/working_papers/2006/wp2006_01.pdf (“[The 
automatic stay gives the bankruptcy court] time to collect and validate claims, to determine the best way to 
dispose of assets in an orderly, non-fire-sale manner, and to treat all like-priority creditors equally. Stays 
prevent creditor runs and keep contracts in force—the counter party is bound by the contract; claims on the 
insolvent firm remain pending; and collateral may usually not be liquidated. This facilitates the coordination of 
creditor claims.”). 
 18 See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(a) (“The debtor may file a plan with a petition commencing a voluntary case, or 
at any time in a voluntary case or an involuntary case.”).  
 19 11 U.S.C. § 507 (establishing that administrative expenses defined in 11 U.S.C § 503(b) will receive 
first priority, followed by secured claims, and then general unsecured claims). 
 20 Christopher M.E. Painter, Tort Creditor Priority in the Secured Credit System, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1045, 
1066 (1984) (“The current priority structure, in which tort creditors are relegated to the status of unsecured 
creditors, undermines the effectiveness of the strict liability regime in precisely this manner.”). 
 21 Id. at 1049–50. 
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tort victims minimizes incentive for creditors of large corporations like GM to 
monitor the DIP’s conduct for potential violations of tort law.22 
While the priority system does not favor tort claimants, the Bankruptcy 
Code does provide safeguards to protect the interests of all creditors. For 
example, a debtor must send a disclosure statement to all of its creditors.23 The 
disclosure statement must be executed in good faith and it must provide 
creditors with adequate information about the debtor’s finances and proposed 
reorganization that will allow creditors to make an informed decision about 
whether they want to approve the plan.24 The disclosure and adequate 
information requirements protect creditors by allowing them to make an 
accurate valuation of the debtor and its assets and liabilities.25 The Bankruptcy 
Code further requires that all classes of creditors generally must accept a 
proposed plan before the plan can be confirmed by the bankruptcy court, 
though there are some exceptions.26 Once a plan is confirmed, the debtor and 
all creditors, including tort creditors, are bound to the plan.27 
Large corporate debtors that have considered bankruptcy protection are 
often in desperate need of a quick solution for their increasing liabilities and 
low cash flows.28 Traditional reorganizations are time-intensive and not 
conducive to quickly increasing cash flows and repaying debts.29 Due to the 
 
 22 See Note, Switching Priorities: Elevating the Status of Tort Claims in Bankruptcy in Pursuit of 
Optimal Deterrence, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2541, 2542–43 (2003) (discussing the effects of a priority system 
which alters the incentives for creditors to monitor the risk of a debtor’s chosen course of conduct). 
 23 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1125(a), 1126(c), 1129(a)(3). 
 24 11 U.S.C. § 1125(a). 
 25 See id.; In re Monnier Bros., 755 F.2d 1336, 1342 (8th Cir. 1985) (“The primary purpose of a 
disclosure statement is to give the creditors the information they need to decide whether to accept the plan.”). 
While § 1125(a) explicitly states that a formal valuation of the debtor’s assets is not required for there to be 
adequate information in the disclosure statement, this Comment suggests that a disclosure statement which 
provides adequate information allows creditors to assess what they consider an accurate valuation of the 
estate’s assets.  
 26 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8). 
 27 Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 1128(a) (describing when the court will approve the plan); 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a) 
(establishing that the confirmed plan binds parties to the bankruptcy case including but not limited to the 
debtor and any creditor). 
 28 See Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process in 
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L.J. 862 (2014) (describing the Chrysler bankruptcy); see also 20 Largest 
Public Company Bankruptcy Filings 1980–Present, BANKRUPTCYDATA.COM, http://www.bankruptcydata. 
com/Research/Largest_Overall_All-Time.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2016).  
 29 The process for a DIP to achieve a confirmable chapter 11 plan was made much more difficult by the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Protection and Consumer Protection Act of 2005. See Douglas E. Deutsch & Michael G. 
Distefano, The Mechanics of a § 363 Sale, AM. BANKR. INST. J. (Feb. 2011), http://www.chadbourne.com/ 
files/Publication/4dbdca20-38ed-4d4c-bc04-a637b7a6997d/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/962b73fc-
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lengthy and complicated nature of a traditional chapter 11 reorganization 
proceeding, debtors have increasingly relied on 363 Sales for a boost of capital 
to help fund the rest of the reorganization process.30 
A 363 Sale allows a debtor to quickly pay off its debts by selling its assets 
at an auction.31 While the creditors and those who hold an interest in the DIP’s 
estate must confirm a traditional chapter 11 plan, a 363 Sale must only be 
approved by the bankruptcy court.32 
Under § 363(f), all assets sold in a 363 Sale are “free and clear of any 
interest in such property. . . .”33 Commentators disagree on the meaning of 
“interest in property” because it is not clearly defined under federal law.34 
While there is little case law on the subject, the majority of courts have 
interpreted the authorization by Congress in § 363(f) as barring successor 
liability claims against the 363 Sale purchaser when the theory for liability is 
based on conduct carried out by the DIP prior to the filing of its bankruptcy 
petition (“successor liability claims”).35 While the Supreme Court has held that 
 
20b1-4652-88a3-a8b84134f4b8/blocks%202-11.pdf; see, e.g., In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 119 (2d Cir. 
2009), vacated as moot, 592 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding that Chrysler’s continuing loses of over $100 
million per day meant that it “fit the paradigm of the melting ice cube”).  
 30 See Hon. J. Vincent Aug, et al., The Plan of Reorganization: A Thing of the Past, 13 J. BANKR. L. & 
PRAC. 3, 4–5 (2004) (“A Section 363 sale is generally the preferred method for selling assets because it is 
quicker and less expensive, and provides a quick fix to address continuing losses, rapidly depleting assets, and 
loss of cash flow.”). 
 31 In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 477 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Campbell v. 
Motors Liquation Co. (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), 428 B.R. 43 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), and aff’d sub nom. Parker 
v. Motors Liquidation Co. (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), 430 B.R. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), enforcement denied 
sub nom. In re Motors Liquidation Co., 529 B.R. 510 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 32 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8); 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (the debtor “after notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or 
lease, other than in the ordinary course of business, property of the estate . . . .”). 
 33 11 U.S.C. § 363(f). 
 34 Rachel P. Corcoran, Why Successor Liability Claims are Not “Interests in Property” Under Section 
363(f), 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 697, 719 (2010). 
 35 These courts follow the broad interpretation for the phrase “interest in such property,” and find the 
scope of the authorization to reach beyond in rem interests. See, e.g., Douglas v. Stamco, 363 F. App’x 100, 
102 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding that the plaintiffs successor liability claim failed due to policy concerns); In re 
Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 115 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated as moot, 592 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2010) (describing the 
“free and clear” provisions in § 363(f) as applying to “liens, claims and liabilities”); In re Trans World 
Airlines, Inc., 322 F.3d 283, 286 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding successor liability claims to be interests in property 
under § 363(f)). But see Zerand-Bernal Grp., Inc. v. Cox, 23 F.3d 159, 163 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that a 363 
Sale will not bar successor product liability claims). Some commentators have argued that in the context of 
successor liability and bankruptcy, an “interest in such property” should never be interpreted as including 
successor liability claims. See generally id. at 725(arguing that federal courts should turn to state law and find 
that an “interest in such property” does not include successor liability claims because no state law includes 
successor liability claims as an “interest in such property”). The term “in rem” is used to describe an action or 
claim in any real or personal property, while the term “in personam” is used to describe a legal action or claim 
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state law is controlling when a property interest is not defined under federal 
law, few courts have actually looked to state law when determining if 
successor liability claims constitute interest in property under § 363(f).36 
Recent history has shown that 363 Sales have been increasingly used to sell 
all or substantially all of the DIP’s assets outside of a reorganization plan 
(“Substantial 363 Sales”).37 Substantial 363 Sales can be quick, with the entire 
process often taking less than three months, and in some cases even taking as 
little as five days.38 Most of the bankruptcy courts that have confirmed these 
363 Sale transactions have done so because there was a potential for large 
groups of individuals to be financially harmed if the DIP were to cease 
operations.39 A Substantial 363 Sale has many advantages over a traditional 
asset sale that occurs outside of bankruptcy. Creditors favored by the priority 
system are more willing to provide long-term financing when a DIP proposes a 
Substantial 363 Sale.40 Substantial 363 Sales maximize the value of the DIP’s 
assets to the benefits of creditors looking to be paid because assets are sold free 
and clear of any preexisting liabilities.41 
 
against an individual. See Action in Rem, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 36 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “action in 
rem” as “[a]n action determining the title of property and the rights of the parties, not merely among 
themselves, but also against all persons at any time claiming an interest in that property” and an “action in 
personam” as “[a]n action brought against a person rather than property.”). 
 36 Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393 (1992); Corcoran, supra note 34. 
 37 363 Sales of All or Substantially All Assets in Large Public Company Bankruptcies, as a Percentage of 
Cases Disposed, by Year of Case Disposition, UCLA-LOPUCKI BANKRUPTCY RESEARCH DATABASE, 
http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/tables_and_graphs/363_sale_percentage.pdf, (last visited Apr. 30, 2016).  
 38 See In re Lehman Bros. Inc., 458 B.R. 134 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2011). 
 39 See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 477 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[T]he 363 sale would 
thereby preserve the going concern value; avoid systematic failure; provide continuing employment; protect 
the many communities dependent upon the continuation of GM’s business, and restore consumer 
confidence.”), aff’d sub nom. Campbell v. Motors Liquation Co. (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), 428 B.R. 43 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010), and aff’d sub nom. Parker v. Motors Liquidation Co. (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), 430 
B.R. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), enforcement denied sub nom. In re Motors Liquidation Co., 529 B.R. 510 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 40 Deutsch & Distefano, supra note 29. 
 41 See In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 116 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated as moot, 592 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 
2010) (“A § 363 sale can often yield the highest price for the assets because the buyer can select the liabilities 
it will assume and purchase a business with cash flow (or the near prospect of it).”); Stephen J. Lubben, No Big 
Deal: The GM and Chrysler Cases in Context, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 531, 535 (2009) (“In particular, the 
ultimate goal is maximizing the value of the estate, to increase the return to creditors.” (citing In re Chung 
King, Inc., 753 F.2d 547, 549 (7th Cir. 1985))). 
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B. GM’s Path to Bankruptcy and 363 Sale 
During the late 1990s, the American automobile manufacturing industry, 
led by GM, faced increased competition from automobile manufacturers 
abroad.42 GM utilized a largely outdated mode of manufacturing and struggled 
to minimize its costs to compete with foreign manufactures.43 GM also had 
difficulty maintaining its healthcare obligations to current and former 
employees, which led to the company agreeing to make healthcare 
contributions totaling $20.56 billion.44 The company was essentially bleeding 
cash and the credit market could only serve as a temporary “band-aid” for the 
problems of the company, which was in desperate need of restructuring.45 The 
economic crisis of 2008 and the frozen credit markets all but ensured GM’s 
eventual collapse.46 
Seeking a quick solution and hoping to avoid a traditional bankruptcy plan 
confirmation, GM turned to § 363 of the Bankruptcy Code to relieve its 
financial distress.47 The GM 363 Sale was unique in that the sale was for 
substantially all of the corporation’s assets and yet the company continued its 
operations after the confirmation of the sale.48 New GM received substantially 
all of the company’s assets while Old GM held on to most of the company’s 
burdensome liabilities, allowing New GM to continue operating free from past 
debts.49 GM’s 363 Sale was essentially a “sleight-of-hand transaction,” in 
which GM used an asset sale to relieve itself from debt and restructure without 
a chapter 11 plan of reorganization. 
The original Master Sale and Purchase Agreement outlined that Old GM 
would retain liabilities including “product liability claims arising out of 
products delivered prior to the Closing” but New GM succumbed to pressure 
from the federal government and agreed to assume future liabilities caused by 
 
 42 Edward J. Estrada, The Immediate and Lasting Impacts of the 2008 Economic Collapse—Lehman 
Brothers, General Motors, and the Secured Credit Markets, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 1111, 1127 (2011).  
 43 Id. 
 44 Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. at 477 (noting that GM entered into a settlement agreement with the 
United Auto Workers to create a new retiree benefit plan that the UAW would control and GM would make 
fixed and capped contributions totaling $20.56 billion in principal amount over the term of the plan). 
 45 Id. (“GM cannot survive with its continuing losses and associated loss of liquidity, and without the 
governmental funding that will expire in a matter of days.”). 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 See id. 
 49 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2012); Krolicki & Bailey, supra note 12. 
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vehicles manufactured by Old GM.50 However, the final 363 Sale Order 
included injunctive provisions barring all future litigations claims “of any kind 
whatsoever, including rights based on any theory of successor or transferee 
liability. . . against the Purchaser, its successors or assigns, its property, or the 
Purchased Assets . . . .”51 GM’s 363 Sale also included provisions outlining 
that New GM would not be considered a “legal successor,” the product of a 
“de facto merger,” or a “mere continuation” of Old GM.52 Consequently, 
despite New GM’s agreement with the federal government, all tort victims of 
Old GM are barred from an equitable remedy. 
Six years after GM’s 363 Sale, GM has recalled more than two and half 
million vehicles due to faulty ignition switches.53 To date, twenty-seven deaths 
have been linked to the defective ignition switches.54 Most of the vehicles 
recalled by GM were manufactured before GM filed for bankruptcy.55 
Consumer injuries and deaths have led to at least fifty-nine class action suits 
against GM.56 GM has acknowledged that it was aware of the ignition switch 
defect prior to filing for bankruptcy.57 Some have even accused GM’s legal 
department of covering up the manufacturing defect.58 Despite GM’s 
 
 50 Order (I) Authorizing Sale of Assets Pursuant To Amended And Restated Master Sale and Purchase 
Agreement with NGMCO, Inc., a U.S. Treasury-Sponsored Purchaser; (II) Authorizing Assumption and 
Assignment of Certain Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases In Connection with the Sale; and (III) 
Granting Related Relief at 29, In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 477 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d sub 
nom. Campbell v. Motors Liquation Co. (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), 428 B.R. 43 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), and 
aff’d sub nom. Parker v. Motors Liquidation Co. (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), 430 B.R. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), 
enforcement denied sub nom. In re Motors Liquidation Co., 529 B.R. 510 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015); Mike 
Spector, GM Agrees to Liability for Defects After Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J. (June 29, 2009), 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB124614495545265019. 
 51 In re Motors Liquidation Co., 513 B.R. 467, 474 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2014). 
 52 Id. 
 53 Jessica Dye, Deaths Linked to GM Ignition-Switch Defect Rise to 27, REUTERS (Oct 13, 2014), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/13/us-gm-recall-fund-idUSKCN0I21JU20141013. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Ignition Recall Safety Information, GENERAL MOTORS, http://www.gmignitionupdate.com/product/ 
public/us/en/GMIgnitionUpdate/index.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2016). 
 56 Hilary Stout & Bill Vlasic, Hoping to Fend Off Suits, G.M. Is to Return to Bankruptcy Court, N.Y. 
Times, (May 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/02/business/hoping-to-fend-off-suits-gm-to-return-to-
bankruptcy-court.html?_r=3. 
 57 Aimee Picchi, GM Lawyer Says Staff Failed in Ignition-Switch Defect, CBS NEWS (July 17, 2014 ), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/gm-lawyer-says-staff-failed-in-ignition-switch-defect/. 
 58 Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 157 (2012) (defining bankruptcy fraud under federal law). The question of 
whether New GM committed bankruptcy fraud hinges on whether a court can find that the corporation 
purposively gave misleading statements regarding information they knew to be true. See 18 U.S.C. § 157. 
Federal prosecutors have been looking to build a case against GM, but it seems unlikely that a court would 
ever find that GM committed fraud. Emily Flitter & Karen Freifeld, Exclusive: Prosecutors’ Case Against GM 
Focuses on Misleading Statements, REUTERS (Jul. 14, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/14/us-
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knowledge of the defect, and the serious harm it has caused consumers, New 
GM petitioned the bankruptcy court to enforce a “bankruptcy shield” against 
all claims for economic loss resulting from the ignition switch recall.59 
In 2014, in In re Motors Liquidation Co., Judge Gerber of the Bankruptcy 
Court for the Southern District of New York enforced the injunctive provision 
in New GM’s 363 Sale, barring successor liability claims against New GM 
relating to damages incurred as a result of the defective ignition switch 
installed in the plaintiff’s vehicle.60 Judge Gerber reasoned that the plaintiff’s 
successor liability claim was explicitly barred by GM’s 363 Sale’s injunctive 
provision because the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint “were undertaken 
by Old GM before New GM was created . . . .”61 This reasoning seems to 
misinterpret the plaintiff’s successor liability claim as a new claim against New 
GM, rather than a claim against Old GM transferred to its successor under the 
doctrine.62 Additionally, by focusing on the injunctive provision in GM’s sale 
agreement, Judge Gerber sidestepped the question of whether § 363(f) permits 
successor liability claims against 363 Sale purchasers.63 
In 2015, Judge Gerber again held that successor liability claims against 
New GM were barred by the 363 Sale, even though New GM had 
acknowledged that some of its employees had knowledge of the ignition switch 
defect.64 The decision was certified for direct review by the Second Circuit, 
and as of date of this publication, a decision is pending.65 
C. Treatment of Successor Liability Claims by Bankruptcy Courts 
The difficult task of balancing the competing policies imposing successor 
liability is further enhanced when examined in the context of bankruptcy.66 
 
gm-recall-probes-idUSKBN0FJ0AW20140714. The remedy in such a situation is unclear, as New GM could 
essentially argue that any remedy should come from the essentially lifeless Old GM. A full analysis of a 
possible bankruptcy fraud case against New GM is outside the scope of this Comment, but there are important 
lessons that should be accounted for when considering the implications of 363 Sales. 
 59 Nick Brown & Jessica Dye, GM’s Fate in Hands of Bankruptcy Judge–Again, REUTERS (May 1, 
2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/02/us-gm-recall-hearing-idUSBREA4101L20140502. 
 60 513 B.R. 467, 476 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014).  
 61 Id. 
 62 See infra Section II.A Successor Liability as a Solution for Sleight-of-Hand 363 Sales; In re Motors 
Liquidation Co., 513 B.R. 467, 476 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 63 Motors Liquidation Co., 513 B.R. at 476. 
 64 In re Motors Liquidation Co., 529 B.R. 510, 557 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 65 Id. 
 66 See Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393 (1985) 
(describing the competing theories that justify the Bankruptcy Code’s goal of a “fresh start” for the debtor). 
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The goals of the Bankruptcy Code are to give struggling debtors a “fresh start” 
while maximizing the value of the debtor’s estate and the proceeds available to 
creditors by coordinating the orderly distribution of the debtor’s assets in 
accordance with the Bankruptcy Code.67 In the context of a chapter 7 
bankruptcy proceeding, the concept of a “fresh start” implies that the 
individual debtor’s past debts and liabilities will be discharged.68 Unlike the 
discharge allowing for the debtor’s “fresh start” in chapter 7 bankruptcy, the 
theory of a “fresh start” under chapter 11 is more aligned with a reorganization 
plan including the process of bargaining with creditors for a reduced payment 
on claims.69 The “fresh start” policy goal therefore differs remarkably for a 
corporate debtor in chapter 11, as a discharge of debt is not a prerequisite for a 
successful rehabilitation of the corporate debtor.70 
Federal courts have found different answers as to whether successor 
liability can exist under the Bankruptcy Code.71 Federal courts that have 
reached the same conclusion have taken very different avenues of in getting 
there.72 As previously discussed, federal courts had historically struggled to 
answer whether a successor liability claim is an “interest in property” under 
§ 363(f) and therefore barred.73 In recent cases the majority of bankruptcy 
courts have denied successor liability claims reasoning that the Bankruptcy 
Code preempts the successor liability doctrine.74 
 
 67 Mitchell Julis, Classifying Rights and Interests Under the Bankruptcy Code, 55 AM. BANKR. L.J. 223 
(1981) (describing the Bankruptcy Code’s goals as including providing a fresh start to the debtor, maximizing 
the value of the estate, and treating all parties with any claims to the estate fairly). 
 68 See 11 U.S.C. § 727 (2012).  
 69 See NextWave Pers. Commc’ns, Inc. v. F.C.C., 254 F.3d 130, 155 (D.C. Cir. 2001), aff’d, 537 U.S. 
293 (2003) (“The purpose of a business reorganization case, unlike a liquidation case, is to restructure a 
business’ finances so that it may continue to operate, provide its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and 
produce a return for its stockholders.” (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220 (1977), reprinted 
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179)) (quotation marks omitted). 
 70 Ashley J. Austin, Comment, Food for Thought: The Efficiencies Achieved by Trimming an Industry at 
Overcapacity Through Mergers vs. Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 25 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 147, 196 n.161 
(2008) (“Chapter 11 reorganization allows creditors to be paid a fraction of what they are owed so that the 
company can have a fresh start in the market.”). 
 71 See Zerand-Bernal Grp., Inc. v. Cox, 23 F.3d 159, 163 (7th Cir. 1994) (interpreting a 363 Sale as only 
extinguishing liens against the debtor, and holding that a successor liability claim is not barred as a result); 
Morgan Olson LLC v. Frederico (In re Grumman Olson Indus.), 467 B.R. 694, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (refusing 
to enforce an injunction that would enjoin the successor liability claim because doing so would violate the 
plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment due process rights).  
 72 Nathan F. Coco, An Examination of Successor Liability in The Post-Bankruptcy Context, 22 J. CORP. 
L. 345, 352 (1997) (alteration in original). 
 73 See supra Part I. Overview of Chapter 11 and 363 Sales. 
 74 See Corcoran, supra note 34, at 747 (discussing the reasoning behind finding preemption of successor 
liability by the bankruptcy code and arguing that the federal courts that employ this line of reasoning to bar 
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II. A SOLUTION FOR SLEIGHT-OF-HAND 363 SALES 
The successor liability doctrine has been used in the corporate law context 
to impose liability on traditional asset purchasers when certain requirements 
are met. This Part of the Comment will explain why successor liability should 
be imposed on GM and similar “Sleight-of-Hand” Substantial 363 Sale 
transactions. First, this Part will describe the doctrine of successor liability and 
trace its development. Second, this Part will argue that if a transaction like 
GM’s Substantial 363 Sale was entered into outside of the bankruptcy context, 
then most courts would find that successor liability must be imposed under 
existing corporate law principles. Third, this Part will argue that in the context 
of a hypothetical Substantial 363 Sale similar to the size and facts of the GM 
case, bankruptcy courts should embrace those same corporate law principles 
and allow for the imposition of successor liability against the purchaser. 
Finally, this Part will argue that the imposition of successor liability on 
transactions similar to GM’s Substantial 363 Sale can be reconciled with the 
policy goals of the Bankruptcy Code. 
A. The Doctrine of Successor Liability 
When considered under a corporate law context, the facts behind GM’s 
Substantial 363 Sale align squarely with the goals of successor liability and the 
types of behavior that the doctrine was intended to prevent. 
As a general rule, when there is a sale or transfer of assets, the purchaser 
will not be liable for the seller’s debts, liabilities, or tortious conduct.75 The 
successor liability doctrine is an exception that some jurisdictions have created 
to the general rule.76 Successor liability is an equitable state-law doctrine that 
the courts have applied on a case-by-case basis.77 The doctrine of successor 
 
successor liability claims are incorrect in their interpretation). The Supreme Court has said that “Congress did 
not intend for the Bankruptcy Code to pre-empt all state laws.” Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. 
Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 505 (1986) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 959(b)). But see In re Grumman Olson Indus., 467 B.R. at 
701 (stating that the federal courts are in general agreement that the Bankruptcy Code preempts state successor 
liability law). 
 75 J. Maxwell Tucker, The Clash of Successor Liability Principles, Reorganization law, and the Just 
Demand that Relief be Afforded Unknown and Unknowable Claimants, 12 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 6 (1995). 
 76 Id. at 9–15 (noting that these exceptions have been based upon a fraudulent transfer, an express or 
implied assumption theory, a de facto merger, a “mere continuation” theory, or a product line exception 
theory). 
 77 See Chi. Truck Drivers, Helpers & Warehouse Workers Union (Indep.) Pension Fund v. Tasemkin, 
Inc., 59 F.3d 48, 49 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that “[s]uccessor liability is an equitable doctrine”); John H. 
Matheson, Successor Liability, 96 MINN. L. REV. 371, 372 (2011). The doctrine of successor liability exists 
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liability does not create a new claim against the purchasing party but rather 
transfers liability from a seller to the purchaser.78While the theories of 
successor liability vary in their application across jurisdictions, they are all 
based on the need to limit the extent that a property transferor can “effectively 
avoid all of its liabilities through transactional sleight-of-hand, leaving 
creditors and other claimants without a viable remedy.”79  
The doctrine of successor liability “seek[s] to balance two competing, and 
often conflicting, policy goals: to provide a necessary remedy to injured 
parties, often tort claimants, and to provide transactional clarity and certainty 
for business parties engaged in fundamental corporate transactions.”80 The 
need for certainty in transactions is based upon the policy goal of promoting 
the free alienability of assets. In other words, the policy goal of promoting the 
ability of an asset owner to sell his or her assets is advanced when the value of 
the asset can be clearly established by a potential purchaser. Because of these 
competing policy interests, the courts have applied the successor liability 
doctrine with great discretion.81 There are four major theories under which the 
courts hold a purchasing party liable under the successor liability doctrine.82 
First, one of the more straightforward applications of the successor liability 
doctrine is the express or implied assumption of liabilities in an acquisition 
agreement.83 As in the case of GM’s 363 Sale, an acquisition agreement 
purporting to assume certain liabilities will expressly indicate all assets that are 
 
under federal common law as well. The rule for successor liability under federal common law is arguably 
broader than under state law. See Coco, supra note 72, at 349 (“[I]n order to protect federal rights or effectuate 
federal policies, [successor liability] allows lawsuits against even a genuinely distinct purchaser if (1) the 
successor had notice of the claim before acquisition and (2) there was substantial continuity in the operation of 
the business before and after the sale.” (quoting Chi. Truck Drivers, 59 F.3d at 49)).  
 78 In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 184 B.R. 910, 920 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1995), vacated, 220 B.R. 909 
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1998) (citing 15 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS § 7122 (perm. ed. 1983)). 
 79 Coco, supra note 72, at 346. 
 80 Matheson, supra note 77, at 372–73 (“Little effort is made to satisfy two policy goals: compensating 
plaintiffs as if the damage-causing business had not terminated; and preventing the rule of successor liability 
from otherwise reducing the free transferability of firms or their assets.” (citing Mark J. Roe, Mergers, 
Acquisitions, and Tort: A Comment on the Problem of Successor Corporation Liability, 70 VA. L. REV. 1559, 
1561–62 (1984))). 
 81 See E.E.O.C. v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936, 944 (7th Cir. 1988) (“The entire issue of successor 
liability . . . is dreadfully tangled, reflecting the difficult of striking the right balance between the competing 
interests at stake.”). 
 82 Tucker, supra note 75, at 9–15 (noting that these exceptions have been based upon a fraudulent 
transfer, an express or implied assumption theory, a de facto merger, a “mere continuation” theory, or a 
product line exception theory). 
 83 Matheson, supra note 77, at 384–87. 
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not assumed by the purchaser.84 The fact that the parties have not expressly 
agreed to the assumption of liabilities is not dispositive on whether a court can 
impose successor liability.85 The assumption of liabilities can either be express 
or implied.86 Thus, even when parties to a transaction expressly limit the 
liabilities transferred from the seller to the purchaser in the terms of their 
agreement, under this theory, a court could hold the purchaser accountable for 
any of seller’s liabilities.87 
Second, courts have imposed successor liability when they determine that a 
sale is actually a fraudulent conveyance carried out to avoid liability.88 While 
actual intent is not required, courts have generally required that the purchaser 
had actual knowledge that they partook in a fraudulent conveyance.89 
A third variation of the successor liability doctrine is the de facto merger 
exception.90 Under the de facto merger theory, a court will look for 
commonality between the two parties of the transaction and examine whether 
the transaction resembles a merger more than a sale.91 If the transaction 
resembles a merger, the successor will not be protected from liability.92 While 
the application of the de facto merger rule has varied, courts have generally 
looked for the following elements: 
(1) continuity of ownership; (2) cessation of ordinary business and 
dissolution of the acquired corporation as soon as possible; (3) 
 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 387. 
 86 See id. at 384–87. 
 87 Id. at 387. 
 88 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 12 (AM. LAW INST. 1998) 
(explaining that successor liability will be imposed when the sale “results from a fraudulent conveyance to 
escape liability for the debts or liabilities of the predecessor”).  
 89 Actual knowledge is required to find that the transaction was actually fraudulent. A transaction can 
also give rise to successor liability when the court finds that the transfer was constructively fraudulent. See 11 
U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2012); UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)(1) (2014) (actual fraud), UNIF. 
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 7 (constructive fraud); see generally BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 
531, 536 (1994). 
 90 See Merger, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 8 (10th ed. 2014) (defining a “de facto merger” as “[a] 
transaction that has the economic effect of a statutory merger but that is cast in the form of an acquisition or 
sale of assets or voting stock); Welco Indus., Inc. v. Applied Cos., 617 N.E.2d 1129, 1134 (Ohio 1993) 
(describing a de facto merger under Ohio law as “a transaction that results in the dissolution of the predecessor 
corporation and is in the nature of a total absorption of the previous business into the successor”).  
 91 Kelly v. Kercher Mach. Works, Inc., 910 F. Supp. 30, 35 (D.N.H. 1995) (“The de facto merger 
exception permits the court to hold a purchaser of business assets liable for the conduct of the transferor 
corporation if the parties have achieved ‘virtually all the results of a merger,’ even if they have not observed 
the statutory requirements of a de jure merger.”).  
 92 Id.  
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assumption by the purchaser of the liabilities ordinarily necessary for 
the uninterrupted continuation of the business of the acquired 
corporation; and (4) continuity of management, personnel, physical 
location, assets, and general business operation.93 
When a court finds that a sale satisfied the elements of a de facto merger, the 
purchaser will assume the debts and liabilities of the seller as a matter of law.94 
A fourth exception that allows for successor liability is the “mere 
continuation” exception.95 The mere continuation theory allows for the 
imposition of liability on an asset purchaser if a court finds that the transaction 
caused substantial commonalities between the seller and the purchaser.96 The 
mere continuation theory and the de facto merger theory both look for a certain 
level of continuity between the buyer and the seller.97 Furthermore, from a 
mass-tort perspective, both theories are aimed at prohibiting an entity from 
engaging in reorganization under the guise of an asset sale for the purpose of 
avoiding liabilities.98 
In 1977, in Ray v. Alad, the California Supreme Court expanded the 
successor liability doctrine by developing the “product-line exception.”99 
While the mere continuation and the de facto merger exceptions focus on the 
overall continuity of the seller and buyer, the “product-line exception” focuses 
on whether the seller and purchaser of manufacturing assets manufacture a 
substantially similar defective product.100 
 
 93 Matheson, supra note 77, at 387 (quoting New York v. Nat’l Serv. Indus., Inc., 460 F.3d 201, 209 (2d 
Cir. 2006)).  
 94 Id. at 387–88; see Michael Carter, Successor Liability Under CERCLA: It’s Time to Fully Embrace 
State Law, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 767, 776–77 (2008) (discussing why an asset sale is generally preferred over a 
statutory merger or the purchase of a controlling interest in stock).  
 95 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 88. 
 96 See Continuation of the Predecessor, Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 30,031G, 2009 WL 4026879 (2009) 
(“the ‘mere continuation’ exception applies when there has been a formal redesignation [sic] of the 
predecessor corporate entity but little or no change in underlying substance”). The court will look for the 
following factors when determining if the asset purchaser is a mere continuation: “(1) the continued use of the 
seller’s name, facilities, and employees, (2) common identity of the stockholders or management of the buyer 
and the seller, and (3) whether only one corporation is in existence after the sale of assets.” Matheson, supra 
note 77, at 391–92. 
 97 These two theories are so similar that some courts have treated them as only theory of successor 
liability. See, e.g., Cargo Partner AG v. Albatrans Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 86 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d, 352 F.3d 41 
(2d Cir. 2003).  
 98 See Matheson, supra note 77, at 390–91. 
 99 560 P.2d 3, 5 (Cal. 1977). 
 100 Id. at 11 (“[A] party which acquires a manufacturing business and continues the output of its line of 
products under the circumstances here presented assumes strict tort liability for defects in units of the same 
product line previously manufactured and distributed by the entity from which the business was acquired.”).  
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In Ray, the purchaser of a manufacturing company continued to 
manufacture its predecessor’s defective ladder under the same name and 
utilized the same employees employed by the predecessor.101 After the sale, an 
individual was injured by the seller’s defective ladder and sued the 
successor.102 The California Supreme Court held that strict tort liability must 
be imposed against a successor when the successor acquires a manufacturing 
business and continues to manufacture a defective product-line of the 
predecessor.103 The Ray court found three factors to be dispositive: 
(1) the virtual destruction of the plaintiff’s remedies against the 
original manufacturer caused by the successor’s acquisition of the 
business, (2) the successor’s ability to assume the original 
manufacturer’s risk-spreading rule, and (3) the fairness of requiring 
the successor to assume a responsibility for defective products that 
was a burden necessarily attached to the original manufacturer’s good 
will being enjoyed by the successor in the continued operation of the 
business.104 
By developing the product-line exception, the court in Ray sought to maximize 
the incentives for manufacturers to protect “otherwise defenseless victims” by 
producing better, safer products.105 
B. Successor Liability as a Solution for Sleight-of-Hand 363 Sales 
This section of the Comment will explain why successor liability should be 
imposed on parties like GM that carry out sleight-of-hand Substantial 363 Sale 
transactions. Successor liability laws work to prevent sleight-of-hand 
transactions by corporations looking to escape liability by entering into an 
asset sale. GM’s Substantial 363 Sale should be considered a sleight-of-hand 
transaction because it allowed GM to relieve itself of its liabilities and because 
of the substantial commonality between Old GM and New GM. In the context 
of a Substantial 363 Sale similar in nature and scale to the GM case, 
bankruptcy courts should embrace the corporate law principles that allow for 
the imposition of successor liability against the purchaser. 
 
 101 Id. at 6. 
 102 Id. at 5. 
 103 Id. at 6; see Phillip I. Blumberg, The Continuity of the Enterprise Doctrine: Corporate Successorship 
in United States Law, 10 FLA. J. INT’L L. 365, 373 (1996) (“[T]he product line doctrine focuses on the 
continuity of the products manufactured by the successor corporation with those of the predecessor rather than 
on continuity of the operations of the business as a whole.”). 
 104 560 P.2d at 8–9. 
 105 Id. at 10 (citing Price v. Shell Oil Co., 466 P.2d 722, 726 (Cal. 1970)). 
WARNER GALLEYSPROOFS 5/11/2016 11:59 AM 
554 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 32 
1. 363 “Sleight-of-Hand” Sale Transactions Should Not Be Considered 
Actual Sales 
A traditional plan of reorganization ensures the orderly distribution of a 
debtor’s estate in an effort to maximize the value of the estate so that each 
creditor is paid to the fullest extent possible. Traditional reorganization serves 
the underlying goals of the bankruptcy system: protecting the rights of all 
creditors and trying to make them whole. Debtors have long used § 363 to sell 
a portion of their assets to generate cash for their reorganization plans. The 
legislative history of § 363 shows that Congress intended to protect the 
collateral of each creditor in the course of a 363 Sale.106 However, § 363 
removes many of the protections for creditors that are in place under the rest of 
the Bankruptcy Code. For example, 363 Sales do not incorporate the disclosure 
requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 1125. Disclosure requirements further the goals of 
tort law by compelling companies seeking bankruptcy protection like GM to 
internalize the costs created by the defective products it manufactured.107 
With few safeguards in place for all creditors, the 363 Sale process is 
susceptible to abuse by the debtor and unsecured creditors are left 
vulnerable.108 Unsecured creditors are unable or simply unwilling to protect 
their interests by taking part in a 363 Sale.109 As a result, a 363 Sale can 
disproportionately advantage the debtor and select creditors.110 
 
 106 See H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 181–84 (1977). 
 107 See generally Switching Priorities, supra note 22. 
 108 A 363 Sale does not afford creditors the same voting rights and disclosure requirements that are 
afforded to them in a traditional chapter 11 process. See Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re 
Lionel), 722 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1983). When a 363 Sales for substantially all of the debtor’s assets 
impermissibly affects the absolute priority rule (referred to as a “sub rosa plan”), the Supreme Court has held 
that such plans are allowed when there is a sufficient “business justification.” See Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. 
Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 37 n.2 (2008); See George W. Kuney, Misinterpreting Bankruptcy 
Code Section 363(f) and Undermining the Chapter 11 Process, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 235, 272 (2002). 
 109 Kuney, supra note 108, at 279–280 (“The increase in preplan sales would appear to negatively impact 
the ability of these low priority creditors to meaningfully participate in the proceedings and look after their 
interests, to the extent they are so inclined . . . . Although creditors’ committees and their counsel ensure some 
protections, the speed at which preplan sales proceed certainly makes it less likely that individual creditors will 
be able to meaningfully participate.” (citing Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control-Systems Failure 
Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code?, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 247 (1983))).  
 110 See Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1, 30–31 
(2007) (discussing how senior lien holders hold advantages in a 363 Sale); Joseph Warburton, Understanding 
the Bankruptcies of Chrysler and General Motors: A Primer, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 531, 547 (2010) (stating 
that “[s]cholars disagree about whether the . . . GM 363 sale constituted [a] reorganization that should have 
been conducted pursuant to plan confirmation procedures instead of section 363 asset sales. In other words, 
were the section 363 transactions true asset sales or were they disguised reorganizations?”). 
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Commentators argue that the debtor’s interest in quickly generating cash 
and relieving debt through an asset sale, combined with the deficiencies 
already described of the 363 Sale process, have caused the 363 Sale to create a 
situation of asymmetric information between the debtor and its smaller 
creditors. In these situations, large corporate debtors often abuse the interests 
of smaller creditors who are not aware of the actual affairs of the debtor.111 The 
larger the debtor, the greater the likelihood that a fast-paced 363 Sale will 
negatively impact a substantial pool of uninformed creditors.112 
The lack of safeguards can become particularly problematic when a debtor 
uses a 363 Sale to sell substantially all of its assets. Substantial 363 Sales by 
large corporations have become increasingly common. Despite the benefits and 
increasing use of Substantial 363 Sales, using a 363 Sale to sell substantially 
all of a debtor’s assets can subvert the goals of the chapter 11 reorganization 
process.113 With less judicial oversight than traditional chapter 11 
reorganization, Substantial 363 Sales open the door to sleight-of-hand 
transactions in which debtors escape their obligations to creditors by 
essentially purchasing all of their own assets debt-free. When a successor in a 
363 Sale receives all of its predecessor’s assets free and clear of liabilities, and 
retains the same shareholders and management as its predecessor while 
continuing operation, then this should be seen as distorted reorganization tool 
rather a traditional asset sale.114 
While GM’s 363 Sale purported to cause a sale of assets from an entity 
referred to as Old GM to a newly formed entity, it would be irrational and 
inequitable to classify this transaction as a traditional asset sale. On March 30, 
2011, the day after GM’s chapter 11 plan was confirmed, the automaker did 
not continue its operations as New GM. The automaker known to millions 
continued its operations as GM, and most of its employees and management 
remained with the company. The White House acknowledged that GM’s 
operations would in large part not be changed upon its bankruptcy filing.115 
 
 111 Kuney, supra note 108, at 282–83 (arguing that the quick resolution that a 363 Sale offers to a large 
corporate debtor who possesses “independent inside knowledge” is more like to increase the potential of 
individuals involved with the operations of the debtor to take advantage of smaller creditors that do not have 
access to the same type of information).  
 112 Jacoby & Janger, supra note 28, at 899–902. 
 113 Kuney, supra note 108, at 235–36. 
 114 See Warburton, supra note 110. 
 115 Obama Administration Auto Restructuring Initiative General Motors Restructuring, WHITE HOUSE, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/fact-sheet-obama-administration-auto-restructuring-initiative-
general-motors (last visited Apr. 28, 2016). 
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The facts around GM’s current success further support the notion that its 363 
Sale was more in line with a reorganization than an asset sale. Only two years 
after GM escaped bankruptcy, the company posted its highest annual profits 
ever recorded.116 The recent success and newfound profitability can be 
attributed to the bankruptcy process allowing the company to restructure itself 
by reducing its plants, renegotiating its labor contracts, and disbanding some of 
the weaker automobile brands in its portfolio.117 These maneuvers are all 
characteristic of a reorganization. 
Outside of the Bankruptcy Code, the ’term “reorganization” is defined as: 
a transfer by a corporation of all or a part of its assets to another 
corporation if immediately after the transfer the transferor, or one or 
more of its shareholders (including persons who were shareholders 
immediately before the transfer), or any combination thereof, is in 
control of the corporation to which the assets are transferred . . . .118 
While § 368 of the Internal Revenue Code is directed towards the tax free 
status of corporate transactions, one court noted that “[t]he purpose of this 
section of the statute is ‘to permit changes in corporate structure that are 
primarily changes in form similar to statutory mergers . . . .’”119 In the other 
words, the term “reorganization,” at least in the manner it is defined in the tax 
code, describes the case of GM, where at least one or more of GM’s 
shareholders remained in control after the approval of its 363 Sale. In a 
reorganization, the transferor or its shareholders retain control even after 
transferring the corporation, much like in a merger.120 By this logic, GM’s 363 
Sale was a reorganization because its shareholders remained in control of the 
company. 
Some commentators view Substantial 363 Sales as impermissible sub rosa 
plans since they allow debtors to circumvent the protections and procedures 
afforded to creditors under the Bankruptcy Code, procedures that were meant 
to perpetuate a fair and orderly reorganization of the bankruptcy estate.121 
 
 116 Chris Isidore, GM Posts Record Profits 2 Years After Bankruptcy, CNN (Feb. 16, 2012), 
http://money.cnn.com/2012/02/16/news/companies/gm_earnings/. 
 117 Id. 
 118 26 U.S.C. § 368(a)(1)(D) (2012). 
 119 In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 1010, 1018 (D. Mass. 1989). 
 120 Id. (stating that reorganization “permit[s] changes in corporate structure that are primarily changes in 
form similar to statutory mergers . . . .”) (quotation marks omitted). 
 121 Motorola, Inc. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Iridium Operating LLC), 478 F.3d 
452, 466 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The reason sub rosa plans are prohibited is based on a fear that a debtor-in-
possession will enter into transactions that will, in effect, ‘“short circuit the requirements of [C]hapter 11 for 
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There is no statutory test in the Bankruptcy Code for when any 363 Sale is 
permissible, which have caused courts to apply varying rules for determining 
whether a 363 Sale amounts to an impermissible sub rosa chapter 11 plan.122 
By no measure was GM’s 363 Sale a traditional asset sale. “New GM” was 
not a new and separate entity that purchased GM’s assets to incorporate into its 
own corporate structure and operations. Post-sale, the automaker known to 
millions worldwide as GM continued operating under largely the same 
management, with most of the same employees. The White House even 
acknowledged that the bankruptcy process would not in large part change 
GM’s operations.123 
The federal government, GM’s largest creditor, exerted force on the 
bankruptcy court to push GM’s 363 Sale through. The 363 Sale was informally 
agreed to by the parties prior to filing for bankruptcy and GM’s other creditors 
were not given the opportunity to assess whether the value of the sale was fair 
and equitable to all parties involved.124 The federal government 
disproportionately benefitted from the sale over other creditors.125 When a 
massive corporation like GM files for bankruptcy, as well as the case of 
Chrysler, the creditor that was disproportionately advantaged also was its 
largest (the U.S. government). In both cases, the government became 
 
confirmation of a reorganization plan.’” (quoting Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Braniff Airways, Inc. (In re 
Braniff Airways, Inc.), 700 F.2d 935, 940 (5th Cir.1983))); Jacob A. Kling, Rethinking 363 Sales, 17 STAN. 
J.L. BUS. & FIN. 258, 267 (2012) (“The most common criticism of 363 sales is that they circumvent the 
procedural protections of Chapter 11, particularly its disclosure and voting requirements.”); Craig A. Sloane, 
The Sub Rosa Plan of Reorganization: Side-Stepping Creditor Protections in Chapter 11, 16 BANKR. DEV. J. 
37 (1999) (“Essentially, the concern regarding a plan sub rosa arises when a debtor in bankruptcy seeks to 
enter into a transaction outside of a plan of reorganization that could have a significant effect upon the 
bankruptcy case and the bankruptcy estate.”); see Sub Rosa, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) 
(defining “sub rosa” as “[c]onfidential; secret; not for publication”).  
 122 See generally Jacoby & Janger, supra note 28. 
 123 See Obama Administration Auto Restructuring Initiative General Motors Restructuring, supra note 
115. 
 124 See Barry E. Adler, A Reassessment of Bankruptcy Reorganization After Chrysler and General 
Motors, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 305, 314–19 (2010). 
 125 In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 473 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Campbell v. 
Motors Liquation Co. (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), 428 B.R. 43 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), and aff’d sub nom. Parker 
v. Motors Liquidation Co. (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), 430 B.R. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), enforcement denied 
sub nom. In re Motors Liquidation Co., 529 B.R. 510 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015); In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 
108 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated as moot, 592 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2010). See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 110 
(discussing how senior lien holders hold advantages in a 363 Sale); Warburton, supra note 110 (“Scholars 
disagree about whether the . . . GM 363 sale constituted [a] reorganization that should have been conducted 
pursuant to plan confirmation procedures instead of section 363 asset sales. In other words, were the section 
363 transactions true asset sales or were they disguised reorganizations?”). 
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concerned that liquidation of the debtor will be a precursor to financial 
disaster, leading to the “too big to fail” or “melting ice cube” phenomena.126 
The court in each case noted the potential for lost jobs and the effect that 
liquidation could have on the rest of the economy.127 
These suggestions in isolation should not justify the speed with which the 
363 Sale took place. While the economic effects of a hypothetical liquidation 
of GM are outside the scope of this Comment, it suffices to acknowledge that 
the “too big to fail” mentality diminishes the incentives of firm managers of 
large corporations like GM to avoid detrimental decisions that might lead the 
corporation into bankruptcy. The “too big to fail” mentality also gives 
incentive to firm managers to abuse the bankruptcy system without 
repercussion. GM’s 363 Sale transaction allowed GM to reorganize while 
avoiding the requirements of a traditional chapter 11 plan of reorganization. It 
is questionable whether it was necessary to bypass most of the chapter 11 
requirements in order for GM to financially recover, but it is clear that doing so 
came at the expense of countless individuals harmed by GM’s defective 
vehicles.  
2. The Detrimental Effect of Sleight-of-Hand 363 Sales on Tort Claimants 
The Bankruptcy Code’s rules for the priority of creditors’ claims do not 
favor tort creditors.128 The “too big to fail” or “melting ice cube” justification 
should be weighed against the tremendous social costs that arise from firms 
avoiding tort liabilities, and forcing consumers injured by their product to 
internalize the cost of their harm.129 The Bankruptcy Code and its priority 
scheme applicable under chapter 11 bankruptcy filings are not favorable 
towards tort creditors.130 Some scholars have argued that tort-liabilities should 
be treated differently than other unsecured creditors, and the priority scheme 
should be changed to reflect the importance of deterring the debtor from 
externalizing costs to potential tort claimants.131 The availability of a 363 Sale 
further disadvantages both present and future tort claimants in bankruptcy, due 
 
 126 See Jacoby & Janger, supra note 28, at 899 (describing struggling corporate debtors and the melting-
ice-cube justification); see also Mike Ramsey & Alex Ortolani, GM Rises After Pelosi Urges Industry Aid 
Plan Passage, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 12, 2008, 4:21 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
newsarchive&sid=a6QTsj05Md04&refer=home.  
 127 Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. at 484–85. 
 128 See Switching Priorities, supra note 22. 
 129 See Jacoby & Janger, supra note 28. 
 130 Switching Priorities, supra note 22. 
 131 See id. 
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in large part to any deterrent function on the debtor’s harmful behavior being 
largely eliminated.132 In the case of GM, where the 363 Sale was informally 
agreed to by the parties prior to GM’s bankruptcy petition being filed, the 
creditors were not afforded the procedures that assured the value of the sale 
was fair and equitable to all parties involved.133 
Commentators have argued that the Bankruptcy Code’s preference for 
secured creditors over tort claimants and other unsecured creditors is the most 
efficient outcome in bankruptcy, but there has been little empirical research to 
support this hypothesis.134 The failure to prioritize tort claimants in effect fails 
to consider the social costs of forcing tort claimants to internalize the cost of 
harm caused by the debtor. To reverse this effect, some scholars have argued 
that tort-liabilities should be treated differently than other unsecured creditors 
and that the priority rules lead to reflect the importance of deterring the debtor 
from externalizing costs to potential tort claimants.135 
However, this would not address the ways in which Substantial 363 Sales 
can further disadvantage present and future tort claimants. If a 363 Sale 
purchaser can simply assert that the sale created a “bankruptcy shield,” 
prohibiting all tort-liability, it eliminates any deterrent function that an 
amended priority scheme would have on the debtor’s harmful behavior.136 
Since the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme devalues tort claims and 
Substantial 363 Sales further diminish a socially optimal outcome for tort 
victims, a carefully crafted rule of successor liability must be applied to force 
corporate debtors engaged in “sleight-of-hand” 363 Sale transactions to 
internalize the cost of their social harms while still enhancing the goals of 
bankruptcy. Commentators have suggested various changes, ranging from 
altering the priority of tort claims, allowing shareholder liability, or allowing a 
“bankruptcy tax” that would force for firms to pay for the lack of any tort 
deterrence in the bankruptcy system.137 
 
 132 See id. at 2550 (“Knowing that bankruptcy is an option, and knowing that bankruptcy rules allow for 
pro rata payment of unsecured debt (including tort debt) followed by discharge of that debt, firms are not 
forced to account for the full risk of accidents.”). 
 133 See Adler, supra note 124. 
 134 Switching Priorities, supra note 22, at 2552. 
 135 See id. 
 136 See id. at 2550 (“Knowing that bankruptcy is an option, and knowing that bankruptcy rules allow for 
pro rata payment of unsecured debt (including tort debt) followed by discharge of that debt, firms are not 
forced to account for the full risk of accidents.”). 
 137 Id. at 2561–64. 
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3. Deterring Large Corporations from Sleight-of-Hand 363 Sales 
The successor liability doctrine offers a safeguard to unsecured creditors 
like tort claimants who otherwise lack protection in sleight-of-hand 363 Sales. 
However, courts and commentators have reached conflicting conclusions 
regarding whether a successor liability claim is an “interests in such property,” 
and thus barred by § 363(f).138 “Despite the courts’ broad interpretation of 
“interests in such property,” some commentators advocate for a narrow 
approach. One commentator argues that the words “‘define the real breadth’ of 
the provision, demonstrate that Congress intended for § 363(f) to apply only to 
in rem interests.”139 The potential for abusive 363 Sales is heightened when 
§ 363(f) is interpreted to include unsecured claims like successor liability 
claims as an “interest in such property.”140 Such an interpretation does not 
follow the plain meaning of the statue and it diminishes the debtor’s incentive 
to actively reduce its liabilities before filing for bankruptcy. In cases like GM, 
there are strong negative implications resulting from a broad interpretation of 
“interests in such property” under § 363(f). A broad interpretation effectively 
bars tort victims from an equitable remedy by creating a situation of 
asymmetric information and perverse incentives, and allows larger creditors to 
abuse the interests of smaller creditors like tort claimants, who are not aware of 
the actual affairs of the debtor.141 
 
 138 These courts follow the broad interpretation to the phrase “interest in such property,” and find the 
scope of the authorization to reach beyond in rem interests. See, e.g., Douglas v. Stamco, 363 F. App’x. 100, 
102 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding that the plaintiffs successor liability claim failed due to policy concerns); In re 
Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 115 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated as moot, 592 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2010) (describing the 
“free and clear” provisions in § 363(f) as applying to “liens, claims and liabilities”); In re Trans World 
Airlines, Inc., 322 F.3d 283, 286 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding successor liability claims to be interests in property 
under §363(f)). But see Zerand-Bernal Grp., Inc. v. Cox, 23 F.3d 159, 163 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that a 363 
Sale will not bar successor product liability claims). Some commentators have argued that in the context of 
successor liability and bankruptcy, an “interest in such property” should never be interpreted as including 
successor liability claims. See generally Corcoran, supra note 34, at 725 (arguing that federal courts should 
turn to state law and find that an “interest in such property” does not include successor liability claims because 
no state law includes successor liability claims as an “interest in such property”). The term “in rem” is used to 
describe an action or claim in any real or personal property, while the term “in personam” is used to describe a 
legal action or claim against an individual. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 35 (defining “action in 
rem” as “[a]n action determining the title of property and the rights of the parties, not merely among 
themselves, but also against all persons at any time claiming an interest in that property” and an “action in 
personam” as “[a]n action brought against a person rather than property.”). 
 139 Coco, supra note 72, at 354 (quoting Fairchild Aircraft, Inc. v. Cambell, 184 B.R. 910, 917 (Bankr. 
W.D. Tex. 1995), vacated by 220 B.R. 909 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1998)). 
 140 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2012).  
 141 This Comment suggests that these pervasive incentives likely contributed to the recent findings that 
GM concealed any knowledge that it had of its defective vehicles for over a decade. See Flitter & Freifeld, 
supra note 58. 
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The disclosure requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 1125 further the goals of tort 
law by compelling companies seeking bankruptcy protection like GM to 
internalize the costs created by the defective products it manufactured.142 
Without this control on large corporate debtors to internalize the costs of harm 
created by their own conduct, and in contrast to the interpretation of § 363(f) 
by the Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District of New York, successor 
liability should be imposed on the company exiting bankruptcy so that the 
costs are equitably distributed between the corporation and those harmed by its 
vehicles.143 A carefully designed rule allowing for the imposition of successor 
liability against the purchaser in a 363 Sale when the purchaser is found to be a 
continuation of the debtor would deter potential debtors from entering into a 
“sleight-of-hand” 363 Sale for the sole purposes of escaping liability. This 
justification has been used for the imposition of successor liability after sales 
have been employed in many contexts outside of bankruptcy.144 A 
manufacturer like GM will only correct defects when the cost of future 
liabilities by accident victims is less than the cost of implementing a higher 
standard of care. An interpretation of § 363(f) that would bar successor liability 
claims would drastically reduce the cost of future liabilities and increase the 
value of the corporation as an asset.145 
III. RECONCILING THE DOCTRINE OF SUCCESSOR LIABILITY WITH THE GOALS 
OF THE BANKRUPTCY PROCESS 
Commentators have frequently argued against successor liability in the 
context of bankruptcy proceedings, claiming that the doctrine runs counter to 
the primary goals of Bankruptcy Code.146 While some have considered it 
difficult to reconcile the policies of successor liability with the policy goals of 
the bankruptcy process, certain changes to the Bankruptcy Code would 
preserve the policy goals of bankruptcy while disincentivizing corporations 
from seeking bankruptcy for the purpose of discharging tort liability. The 
bankruptcy cases of GM and Chrysler were unique due to the substantial size 
 
 142 See generally Switching Priorities, supra note 22. 
 143 See In re Motors Liquidation Co., 513 B.R. 467 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 144 See Delta Health Grp., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 459 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1223 
(N.D. Fla. 2006) (“[S]uccessor liability for . . . existing debts is used as a means to curb fraud and sham 
transactions . . . .”) (quotation marks omitted); E.E.O.C. v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936, 944 (7th Cir. 1988) (“In 
favor of successor liability is the interest in preventing tortfeasors from externalizing the costs of their 
misconduct by selling their assets free of any liabilities and distributing the proceeds to their shareholders.”). 
 145 11 U.S.C. § 363(f). 
 146 See Corcoran, supra note 34, at 749. 
WARNER GALLEYSPROOFS 5/11/2016 11:59 AM 
562 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 32 
of the debtor and the background of the 2008 financial crisis. It is the position 
of this Comment that, while the facts of the GM bankruptcy and ensuing 
product recall are without precedent, Congress should act in order to alter the 
incentive structure for other large firms entering bankruptcy to externalize the 
cost of future harm by abusing the 363 Sale option.  
Successor liability laws allowing for claims against GM are not preempted 
by § 363 of the Bankruptcy Code and are all to some degree based upon the 
policy of limiting companies from engaging in a purported asset sale that 
resembles a merger more than it does a sale.147 The objective of these laws is 
to deter companies from seeking to avoid liabilities by engaging in mergers or 
internal reorganizations that are masked as traditional asset sales. In the 
context of firms like GM, “[t]he purpose underlying successor liability is to 
protect defenseless victims of manufacturer’s defects and spread the cost of 
compensation throughout society.”148 
Outside of 363 Sales, in a traditional reorganization the Bankruptcy Code 
allows for the use of a “merger or consolidation”149 or a transfer of all or 
substantially all of the debtor’s assets, and authorizes the sale of stock to 
another other entity while in bankruptcy.150 Commentators argue that the use 
of this language in the Bankruptcy Code conflicts with successor liability laws. 
This argument follows that successor liability law are preempted by the 
Bankruptcy Code because the Bankruptcy Code authorizes this same type of de 
facto merger that the successor liability is intended to prevent. This argument 
focuses on the central policies of successor liability and the Bankruptcy Code, 
claiming that they conflict because the imposition of successor liability 
disallows the debtor to be “free and clear” of future interest and cannot be 
reconciled with the Bankruptcy Code’s policy goal of maximizing the value of 
the debtor’s estate.151 
 
 147 See supra Part I.C. Treatment of Successor Liability Claims by the Bankruptcy Courts. 
 148 Volvo White Truck Corp. v. Chambersburg Beverage (In re White Motor Credit Corp.), 75 B.R. 944, 
950 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987). 
 149 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(c). 
 150 Tucker, supra note 75, at 30 (“If the Bankruptcy Code allows a plan to propose a sale that otherwise 
constitutes a de facto merger, ‘notwithstanding otherwise applicable nonbankruptcy law,’ any state law 
permitting recovery against the successor interferes with the flexibility permitted by the Bankruptcy Code.” 
(quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a))). 
 151 See White Motor Credit Corp., 75 B.R. at 950 (“A primary purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to grant 
debtors ‘a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and 
discouragement of pre-existing debt.’” (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934))). 
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It is this Comment’s contention that there is no clear intent by Congress in 
the text of the Bankruptcy Code to preempt state successor liability laws in 363 
Sales involving all or substantially all of the debtors assets by the language in 
§ 363(f).152 As a matter of statutory interpretation, Congress has used clear 
language in the Bankruptcy Code when it has intended to preempt state law.153 
If Congress intended for the “free and clear” authorization in § 363(f) to 
displace state successor liability law, it would have included language that 
indicates such an intent to do so.154 In the context of bankruptcy, when a 
provision of the Bankruptcy Code does not elicit Congress’ intent to preempt 
state law, then courts should follow the presumption against inferring 
preemption.155 Congress did include indication of its intent in § 363(f)(1), 
which authorizes a 363 Sale “free and clear” when “applicable nonbankruptcy 
law permits sale of such property free and clear of such interest.”156 By 
permitting the application of state law, the clear language of § 363(f)(1) 
suggests that state successor liability laws should apply.157 
Avoiding an argument on Congressional intent, various courts and 
commentators have suggested that the Bankruptcy Code preempts state 
successor liability law because the policy goals of the Bankruptcy Code cannot 
be reconciled with state law doctrine.158 The next section of this Comment will 
illustrate that this argument fails to properly balance the extent of any 
disruption to the Bankruptcy Code’s policy goals against the social benefits 
 
 152 Integrated Sols., Inc. v. Serv. Support Specialties, Inc., 124 F.3d 487, 493 (3d Cir. 1997) (comparing 
the clear Congressional intent to preempt state law in § 1123 with the lack of intent shown in § 363). 
 153 See id. (“The clear lack of Congressional intent [in § 363] to preempt state law restrictions on 
transferring property of the estate is even more telling given the explicit language that Congress uses when it 
intends to displace state nonbankruptcy law in other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.”). 
 154 See id. (“Notwithstanding any otherwise applicable nonbankruptcy law, a [reorganization] plan shall 
. . . .”) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)) (“Notwithstanding any otherwise applicable nonbankruptcy law, a 
[reorganization] plan shall . . .”); 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1) (“[A]n interest of the debtor in property becomes 
property of the estate . . . notwithstanding any provision in . . . applicable nonbankruptcy law (A) that restricts 
or conditions transfer of such interest by the debtor”); 11 U.S.C. § 363(l) (“Subject to the provisions of section 
365, the trustee may use, sell, or lease property under subsection (b) or (c) of this section, . . . notwithstanding 
any provision in . . . applicable law that is conditioned on the insolvency or financial condition of the 
debtor, . . .”). 
 155 See Integrated Sols., Inc., 124 F.3d at 493 (“[S]trong presumption against inferring Congressional 
preemption in the bankruptcy context.” (citing In re Roach, 824 F.2d 1370, 1373–74 (3d Cir.1987)). 
 156 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(1) (2012). 
 157 Id. 
 158 See Volvo White Truck Corp. v. Chambersburg Beverage (In re White Motor Credit Corp.), 75 B.R. 
944, 950 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987) (arguing that preemption applies because “[t]he federal purpose of final 
resolution and discharge of corporate debt is clearly compromised by imposing successor liability on 
purchasers of assets when the underlying liability has been discharged under a plan of reorganization”). 
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caused by the allowances of successor liability tort claims and the changes in 
incentives to large firms.159 
A. Priority Scheme of the Bankruptcy Code 
The imposition of successor liability can be reconciled with the priority 
scheme established by the Bankruptcy Code.160 The imposition of successor 
liability does not share a direct connection to the distribution of the estate, 
especially considering that the successor liability claims arise after the 363 
Sale has been ordered and the bankruptcy plan has been confirmed. Courts 
have often relied on the notion that successor liability claims affect the 
Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme, with little analysis supplementing its 
conclusion.161 For example, in In re White Motor Credit Corp., the court 
followed this justification for not imposing successor liability and stated: 
The effects of successor liability in the context of a corporate reor-
ganization preclude its imposition. The successor liability specter 
would chill and deleteriously affect sales of corporate assets, forcing 
debtors to accept less on sales to compensate for this potential liabil-
ity. This negative effect on sales would only benefit product liability 
claimants, thereby subverting specific statutory priorities established 
by the Bankruptcy Code.162 
Overall, a court’s analysis of allowing successor liability claims should vary 
substantially based upon when the issue is raised. Lower federal courts have 
held differently on the matter, and the Supreme Court has not yet heard a 
matter regarding the manner which federal courts should handle future claims. 
 
 159 As this Comment argues, allowing successor liability will incentivize large firms to internalize the cost 
of the harms it causes.  
 160 11 U.S.C. § 507 (setting the priority and order of the payment of unsecured claims). 
 161 See In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 126 (2d Cir. 2009) (claiming that the imposition of successor 
liability on the purchaser would violate the priority scheme of the Bankruptcy Code), vacated on other 
grounds by 592 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2010); In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., 322 F.3d 283, 291 (“Even were we 
to conclude that the claims at issue are not interests in property, the priority scheme of the Bankruptcy Code 
supports the transfer of TWA’s assets free and clear of the claims.”); In re Lady H Coal, Co., Inc., 199 B.R. 
595, 605 n.6 (Bankr. S.D. W. Va. 1996) (“It is conceptually difficult to understand how an unsecured creditor 
can assert that they are to be excluded from the definition of ‘interests’ as utilized in the Bankruptcy Code in 
§ 363(f). Such exclusion would result in an unsecured creditor later asserting the same claim against a good 
faith purchaser, which would disrupt, and give priority and preference to an unsecured creditor.”); Am. Living 
Sys. v. Bonapfel (In re All Am. of Ashburn, Inc.), 56 B.R. 186, 190 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986) (“There is no 
suggestion of Congressional intent to apply the successor doctrine to elevate product liability claims above 
their status under the Bankruptcy Code.”). 
 162 75 B.R. 944, 951 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987). 
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In Douglas v. Stamco, the Second Circuit weighed in on the issue of future 
claims, and held on a summary judgment order, that allowing future claims 
would go against the policies of the Bankruptcy Code.163 In Douglas, the 
plaintiff was injured in 2001 by a machine that was manufactured by the 
debtor, prior to an approved 363 Sale of the debtor’s assets.164 The plaintiff 
filed suit in 2005, after the 363 Sale was ordered, but prior to the close of the 
bankruptcy case, against the 363 Sale purchaser.165 The court reasoned that 
“[a]llowing the plaintiff to proceed with his tort claim directly against [the 363 
Sale purchaser] would be inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code’s priority 
scheme because a plaintiff’s claim is otherwise a low-priority, unsecured 
claim.”166 
The Second Circuit used circular reasoning with regards to the effect that 
the plaintiff’s claim would have on the priority scheme of the Bankruptcy 
Code.167 The Court failed to consider the fact that “the predecessor entity . . . 
survived the asset sale as a bankrupt entity,” meaning that the priority scheme 
had already been applied to the debtor’s estate and would in no way be 
affected by the court allowing the plaintiff’s claim against the successor.168 
Other courts have recognized the logical flaw in the Second Circuit’s 
reasoning. Prior to the Second Circuit’s summary judgment order in Douglas, 
the Seventh Circuit in Zerand-Bernal Group disagreed with the argument that 
it should enjoin a successor liability claim because the allowance of such a 
claim would disrupt the priority scheme of the Bankruptcy Code.169 The 
Zernard-Bernal case involved a plaintiff asking for injunctive relief from a 
state-law successor liability claim made in federal court.170 While the court 
held that it would not enjoin the state-law successor liability action because it 
did not have jurisdiction over the matter, the court stated in dicta that a 
 
 163 363 F. App’x 100 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 164 Id. at 101. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. at 102 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (2006); Trans World Airlines, Inc., 322 F.3d at 292 (“To allow the 
[plaintiff] to assert successor liability claims against [the purchaser] while limiting other creditors’ recourse to 
the proceeds of the asset sale would be inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme.”). 
 167 Douglas, 363 F. App’x at 101. 
 168 Id. 
 169 23 F.3d 159 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 170 Id. at 161. 
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successor liability claim could not affect the size of the debtor’s estate 
available to the creditors since the estate had long been distributed.171 
The Zernard-Bernal Court’s holding that it did not have bankruptcy 
jurisdiction over the issue of successor liability is central to the idea that the 
question of successor liability is distinct from the distribution of the estate.172 
The court implied that the only way a court would have federal bankruptcy 
jurisdiction over the matter was if the asset purchaser could revoke its sale 
agreement as a result of the court’s decision.173 If a party seeking to impose 
successor liability files suit prior to the entry of the sale order, then the 
imposition of successor liability should be considered a threat to the plan and 
the priority scheme of the Bankruptcy Code.174 When a successor liability 
claim is pursued after the distribution of the debtor’s estate, then the successor 
liability claim would not be detrimental to the priority scheme of the 
Bankruptcy Code.175 
B. Preserving the Debtor’s Fresh Start 
The question of how the imposition of successor liability will affect the 
Bankruptcy Code’s goal of preserving the debtor’s “fresh start” is also 
dependent on when the issue is evaluated. If the issue were evaluated after the 
distribution of the debtor’s estate, then the bankruptcy process policy goal of 
preserving the “fresh start” of the debtor would not be harmed by allowing 
successor liability claims against a 363 Sale purchaser. The “fresh start” goal is 
 
 171 Id. at 162–64 (“[T]he [state-law successor liability claim] cannot possibly affect the amount of 
property available for distribution to [the debtor]’s creditors . . . [when] [a]ll of [the debtor]’s property has 
already been distributed . . . .”). 
 172 Id. at 164.  
 173 Id. at 163. The Supreme Court recently held that federal courts do have jurisdiction under federal 
bankruptcy law to review their post orders. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 557 U.S. 137, 151 (2009). It is 
questionable whether the Travelers holding answered whether federal courts have jurisdiction to review 
successor liability claims against an asset purchaser, but the discussion regarding jurisdiction of these claims is 
outside the scope of this Comment. See 557 U.S. at 155 (“Our holding is narrow. . . . On direct review today, a 
channeling injunction . . . would have to be measured against the requirements of § 524 (to begin with, at 
least). . . . [W]e do not address the scope of an injunction authorized by that section.”). 
 174 Zerand-Bernal Grp., 23 F.3d at 164 (“An attack on a sale agreement that is the core and premise of a 
plan of reorganization is an attack on the plan itself, because the sale could not be undone without rescinding 
the plan, and an order confirming a plan becomes irrevocable (barring fraud) 180 days after its entry, 11 
U.S.C. § 1144 . . . .”). 
 175 See Chi. Truck Drivers, Helpers & Warehouse Workers Union (Indep.) Pension Fund v. Tasemkin, 
Inc., 59 F.3d 48, 50 n.2 (7th Cir.1995) (“[T]his case does not directly implicate the Bankruptcy Code, since the 
underlying bankruptcy proceeding is long over.”). 
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meant to preserve the estate of the debtor rather than being geared towards 
preserving the financial well-being and independence of the successor.176 
If evaluated at the time of the bankruptcy proceeding, then an argument 
that liability on the successor would impact the “fresh start” of the debtor relies 
on a misinterpretation of the doctrine of successor liability. In a situation where 
the injury did not occur until after confirmation of the bankruptcy, tort 
claimants who are defined as individuals harmed as a result of pre-bankruptcy 
conduct by the debtor, do not have a claim to any liability against the debtor 
until the injury actually occurs.177 At the time of the bankruptcy case, the 
future claimant would not a have a claim under the Bankruptcy Code, and 
therefore would not be considered part of the debtor’s estate.178 
After a 363 Sale is approved, the bankruptcy plan is confirmed, and the 
debtor has received a discharge. The discharge is largely synonymous with a 
“fresh start” and is an important function of the Bankruptcy Code because it 
bars actions by future claimants against the debtor.179 Importantly, the 
discharge only works to bar actions against the debtor and not against any 
other entity.180 Therefore, the future imposition of successor liability on a 363 
Sale purchaser will not affect the debtor’s “fresh start.”181 
C. Maximizing the Value of the Estate Should be Balanced Against the 
Limited Amount of Creditors Who Will See Such Value 
The most often used criticism of allowing successor liability in context of 
bankruptcy is the effect that it will have on the maximization of the value of 
the debtor’s estate. This criticism coincides with the notion that potential 363 
Sale purchasers would be less likely to acquire any assets when they cannot 
 
 176 See Clark v. Rameker, 134 S. Ct. 2242, 2248 (2014) (describing the policy goal of Bankruptcy Code of 
preserving the debtor’s the “fresh start”) (emphasis added); Jackson, supra note 66 (discussing the policy 
objective of preserving the debtor’s “fresh start”) (emphasis added).  
 177 In re Grumman Olson Indus., Inc., 467 B.R. 694, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Generally, courts have held 
that future claims cannot be considered ‘claims’ that are dealt with and discharged by a confirmation plan.”). 
 178 Id. 
 179 11 U.S.C. § 524 (2012) (describing the effects of a discharge being granted). 
 180 Id. (“[D]ischarge of a debt of a debtor does not affect the liability of any other entity, or the property of 
any other entity for, such debt.”). 
 181 Michael L. Tuchin & Martin R. Barash, Protecting the Rights of Claimants That Are Excluded from 
the Bankruptcy Process: The Survival of Successor Liability and Alternative Means of Recovery, 8 J. BANKR. 
L. & PRAC. 273, 274 (1999) (“[T]his [fresh start] critique is overstated, if not altogether wrong.”). 
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properly value the costs of future liabilities, including tort liabilities.182 This 
Comment contends that this argument is exaggerated and fails to consider 
other economic incentives that affect a buyer’s decision to participate in the 
transaction. In the context of a 363 Sale, value maximization coincides with 
encouraging bidding on the debtor’s assets and not “chilling bids.”183 In any 
case, the extent that a purchaser of assets was induced to finalize the 
transaction as a result of the assets being sold free and clear of future tort 
liability attached to the assets seems questionable at best. 
Courts have failed to sufficiently analyze the issue of value maximization. 
The Second Circuit has stated: 
to the extent that the ‘free and clear’ nature of the sale . . . was a cru-
cial inducement in the sale’s successful transaction, it is evident that 
the potential chilling effect of allowing a tort claim subsequent to the 
sale would run counter to a core aim of the Bankruptcy Code, which 
is to maximize the value of the assets and thereby maximize potential 
recovery to the creditors.184 
It is accurate to say that the free and clear provisions of § 363(f) do 
increase the value of the estate of the debtor.185 The analysis by the Second 
Circuit seemed to suggest that any reduction of value, no matter the extent of 
the reduction, would run counter to the Bankruptcy Code and would require 
the court to block any or all future interests or claims. This Comment suggests 
that Congress did not intend for § 363(f) to bar all types of claims against the 
purchaser in a 363 Sale.186 In drafting § 363(f), and qualifying its application 
only to “interests in such property,” Congress indicated a clear intent to 
promulgate some sort of boundary to the application of this provision.187 This 
Comment takes the position that the value created by the “free and clear” 
provisions must be weighed against the value created in changing the 
incentives for firms prior to entering bankruptcy as well as the value created 
for otherwise unprotected tort claimants. A bankruptcy court’s power to 
enforce the “free and clear” provision ultimately stems from the equity powers 
granted to the court by the Bankruptcy Code. For the application of the “free 
 
 182 See In re Chrysler, 576 F.3d 108, 126 (2d Cir. 2009) (“The possibility of transferring assets free and 
clear of existing tort liability was a critical inducement to the Sale.”), vacated on other grounds, 592 F.3d 370 
(2d Cir. 2010). 
 183 Kling, supra note 121, at 280–84 (discussing the affecting bid-chilling in 363 Sales). 
 184 Douglas v. Stamco, 363 F. App’x 100, 102–03 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 185 The estate’s value will increase due to future liabilities not being accounted for in the valuation.  
 186 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2012). 
 187 Id. 
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and clear” provision to be applied equitably to all parties, courts should 
evaluate the bid chilling affect and lost value against the interests of future tort 
claimants. This is almost impossible for a court to do in the case where a judge 
would not have adequate information to weigh the interests of future tort 
claims. 
A quick “sleight-of-hand” Substantial 363 Sale similar to GM’s case 
further prohibits judges from weighing future tort claimants’ interests, since it 
allows firms to escape accurately disclosing and evaluating future tort 
liabilities. This Comment suggests that Congress should correct this 
information failure by amending § 363 to allow for successor tort liability 
claims under a carefully crafted successor liability rule that incorporates 
elements of the “mere continuation” rule and the product-line exception. This 
hybrid successor liability exception will be narrow in scope so as not to affect 
the goals of the Bankruptcy Code, but sufficient to protect against companies 
like GM from concealing information regarding potential harm to consumers 
for over ten years. 
D. Internalizing the Costs of Harm with Successor Liability 
The successor liability doctrine advances the objectives of tort law by 
compelling the successor manufacturer to internalize the costs of victims 
injured by its defective products.188 “[T]ort law serves an important deterrent 
function by making harmful activities more expensive, and thereby less 
attractive to the extent of the accident costs they cause.”189 
When a company implements a higher standard of care in the 
manufacturing of its product, potential defects would be minimized, thus 
decreasing the amount of future accidents by consumers. If a company 
decreases the amount of accidents that would likely occur in the future, then 
the company would decrease the costs of future tort liabilities relating to 
accidents by consumers. Unfortunately, there are also costs for a company to 
implement a higher level of care in the manufacturing process. If the costs of 
implementation of a higher standard of manufacturing are greater than the cost 
 
 188 Switching Priorities, supra note 22, at 2546 (“For tort to accomplish its primary goal, firms must 
internalize the cost of accidents: only when businesses internalize costs will they take the socially optimal 
level of precautions ex ante.”). 
 189 Matheson, supra note 77, at 408 (citing Timothy J. Murphy, Comment, A Policy Analysis of a 
Successor Corporation’s Liability for Its Predecessor’s Defective Products When the Successor Has Acquired 
the Predecessor’s Assets for Cash, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 815, 821–22 (1988), (quoting Guido Calabresi, The 
Costs of Accidents 26 (1970))). 
WARNER GALLEYSPROOFS 5/11/2016 11:59 AM 
570 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 32 
of future tort liabilities, then the company will likely choose the status quo, and 
abstain from improving standards and correcting defects. The assets of a 
manufacturing company would be severely devalued if successor liability 
claims would be allowed against the purchaser. By forcing the potential-seller 
to deal with the costs of this asset devaluation, the purchaser will look to cure 
any defects in manufacturing and implement a higher standard of care.190 
An argument against the deterrence effect on successor manufacturers 
would be that the successor has no ability to limit the potential for future 
liabilities associated with defective products that were manufactured by its 
predecessor.191 This argument misses a crucial factor of the doctrine of 
successor liability being based upon a balancing of equitable principles.192 By 
finding that imposing liability on a successor that continues to manufacture a 
product that was first manufactured by its predecessor and is considered 
defective or is likely to cause injury to defenseless victims, the court is 
essentially balancing the policy aims of deterring harmful activity (i.e., the 
manufacturing of defective products) and the notion that tort-liability should be 
imposed on the party responsible for the injury. 
It is correct that the successor would have no actual control over the extent 
of future accidents costs associated with the products that were manufactured 
by its predecessor, but it would have control over the legal imposition of 
liability associated with those claims. If a successor chooses to cure the defect 
in the product and implements a higher standard of care in its manufacturing 
process, then the court should refuse to impose successor liability claims under 
those circumstances. A court’s imposition of successor liability on a successor 
that continues to manufacture a defective product accounts for the fact that in 
some situations the successor’s cost of correcting a defective product are so 
low that but for the imposition of successor liability, the successor 
manufacturer would not have chosen to remedy such a defect. The impositions 
 
 190 Id. at 408 n.165 (“If manufacturers know they will be liable for the costs of accidents their products 
cause, the deterrence theory encourages manufacturers to make safer products in order to avoid the extra costs 
of accidents.” (citing Murphy, supra note 189, at 838 n.157)) (quotation marks omitted). 
 191 Id. at 408 (“The successor has had no part in creating the injurious product and has no ability to limit 
future injuries resulting from prior defects. By using the successor as a conduit in an attempt to pass the cost of 
injuries through to the predecessor, current successor liability law fails to force the full cost of claimants’ 
injuries to be borne by defective manufacturers.” (citing Michael D. Green, Successor Liability: The 
Superiority of Statutory Reform to Protect Products Liability Claimants, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 17, 35–36 
(1986))). 
 192 Marie T. Reilly, Making Sense of Successor Liability, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 745, 746 (2003) (“[The] 
imposition of successor liability seems to be an application of a court’s equitable power to elevate substance 
over form.” (citing Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 312 (1939))). 
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of successor liability alters the incentive of the successor manufacturer to 
change its product, which will result in future consumers being able to avoid 
harm.193 
E. Proposal for a Hybrid Successor Liability Rule 
A hybrid successor liability law, which incorporates aspects of the “mere 
continuation” exception and the product line exception, is needed to alter large 
firm manufactures like GM to conceal future liabilities by increasing the 
present costs for those firms to continue to operate. A hybrid successor liability 
law rule would protect tort victims and would hold against criticism that it 
would cut against the goals of bankruptcy. While the “mere continuation” or 
the de facto exception for successor product liability could succumb to 
criticisms that it bars exactly what bankruptcy seeks to accomplish, a hybrid 
rule can be reconciled with the Bankruptcy Code as it would specifically target 
firms that have the potential to create harm through the manufacturing of a 
large volume of products.194 When balancing the equities of the decreased 
value of the estate and the decrease in costs to future tort victims, a court 
should find that the imposition of this hybrid successor tort liability law would 
provide for a more efficient outcome that would protect consumers and still 
allow for the debtors “fresh start”. 
F. Policy Considerations Above and Beyond the Goals of Bankruptcy 
The effect of § 363(f) in barring future successor liability claims also raises 
Fifth Amendment Due Process concerns.  
In the case of GM, consumers who purchased a recalled vehicle prior to the 
petition filing date and were injured after the filing date are future claimants 
who have not yet been injured and are inherently unknown and unidentifiable 
at the time of the filing. As previously discussed, it would be incorrect to 
construe these future claimants as having had cognizable claims under the 
Bankruptcy Code against the estate during the time of the bankruptcy case.195 
Due Process and the requirement of notice is a critical component of 
Bankruptcy.196 Courts have analyzed the requirement of notice by evaluating 
 
 193 See, e.g., Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 5 (Cal. 1977). 
 194 See supra Part II.A. for a discussion about the doctrine of Successor Liability. 
 195 In re Grumman Olson Indus., Inc., 467 B.R. 694, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Generally, courts have held 
that future claims cannot be considered ‘claims’ that are dealt with and discharged by a confirmation plan.”). 
 196 Id. at 706. 
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the opportunity that a claimant had to participate in the bankruptcy case.197 The 
Bankruptcy Code often requires a “notice and hearing” before a bankruptcy 
court can affect the rights of a party.198 A future claimant could not possibly 
have the opportunity for notice and hearing when their claim (i.e. injury due to 
product defect) has not yet occurred. Courts are beginning to acknowledge the 
Due Process concerns that arise when the “free and clear” provision is applied 
in a manner that extinguished future successor liability claims.199 
In In re Grunman Olson Industries, the court held that enforcing a § 363 
Sale order by enjoining a state law tort suit brought by the plaintiff “would 
deny [the plaintiff] due process and violate the Bankruptcy Code’s 
requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard for those affected by a 
bankruptcy court’s ruling.”200 The court found that the purchasers of defective 
vehicles that had not yet been recalled did not have a contingent claim at the 
time of the filing of the petition.201 The court explained that future claims that 
were not at least contingent could not be classified as claims under the 
Bankruptcy Code.202 
In In re Old Carco LLC, the court held that the ejection of a tort suit against 
the successor in interest to a bankrupt debtor who manufactured recalled 
vehicles that caused injury did not violate due process because of the pre-
petition relationship between the plaintiff and the debtor.203 The Court 
determined that the prior relationship meant that the plaintiff had at least a 
contingent claim at the time the petition was filed, partly due to recalls being 
published prior to the petition date.204 
In cases like GM, it would be hard to find that the individuals who suffered 
injuries from a defective product after the confirmation of the bankruptcy plan 
had a “contingent claim” that was at the time of the bankruptcy case.205 
Ultimately a claimant who is injured after a bankruptcy confirmation by a 
product manufactured prior to the petition date could not possibly have notice 
 
 197 See Wright v. Corning, 679 F.3d 101, 103–04 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1239 (2013) 
(“The Plan provided for the discharge of all claims relating to the Debtors under the Bankruptcy Code that 
arose before the Confirmation Date.”). 
 198 Grumman Olson Indus., Inc., 467 B.R. at 706. 
 199 Id. 
 200 Id. at 711. 
 201 Id. 
 202 Id. 
 203 492 B.R. 392, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 204 Id. 
 205 In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1004 (2d Cir. 1991). 
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of his claim being unsecured against the debtor. By applying the “free and 
clear” provisions in a manner that enjoins successor liability claims from 
claimants who were injured after the confirmation of the bankruptcy, serious 
Due Process concerns arise as these future claimants had no right to redress of 
their claim during the administration of the bankruptcy case. These individuals 
Due Process rights should trump the Bankruptcy Code’s grant of authority 
under § 363(f) as being interpreted to discharge future tort claims. 
CONCLUSION 
The federal courts should apply a carefully crafted rule for successor 
liability in order to protect against issues that arise in cases similar to GM’s 
363 Sale. The product-line exception for successor liability and the mere 
continuation theory would be a sufficient starting point for addressing those 
sorts of issues.206 The product-line exception for successor liability is based 
upon the premise of altering a company’s incentive structure in choosing 
whether or not to correct the manufacturing of a defective product. The 
combination of these rules would work to effectively prevent a “sleight-of-
hand” Substantial 363 Sale from being utilized to mask an internal 
restructuring as a traditional asset purchase and sale to avoid liability. The due 
process rights of future claimants who never had notice of their claim against 
the debtor should trump the grant of authority in § 363 to discharge their claim 
against the successor in interest.207 
The goals of bankruptcy and successor liability can be balanced when 
successor liability is applied appropriately. The hybrid rule, which incorporates 
elements of the mere continuation and product line exception, allows for the 
proper balance of these policies. A successor liability rule that is similar to the 
hybrid rule proposed in this Comment, and one that is applied in a manner that 
inhibits companies from masking future liabilities, would not undercut the goal 
of maximizing the value of the estate. While evidence of this sort of behavior 
by large manufacturing companies is not readily apparent, certain factors 
including the continuation of conduct by the successor, the continuation of it 
operations, combined with continued manufacturing of the same product that 
caused injury, would be telling as to the probability of an intention to avoid 
liability. In sum, successor liability would prevent a future case like GM, 
where the company is now experiencing record profits while the families of the 
 
 206 Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 5 (Cal. 1977). 
 207 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2012). 
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